Abstract. This article starts criticizing the understanding that finite set theory (ZF Hf in ) is the set theoretic equivalent of arithmetic (PA). We argue that 'a version of set theory' should be a subtheory of our axioms for set theory. However, we prove that no subtheory of any extension of Zermelo set theory is bi-interpretable with any extension of PA. Further, we show that, for every wellfounded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defining the coordination problem. In summary, we consider two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How likely are they to be coordinated regarding PA's interpretation in ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not interpretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that a random extension of arithmetic to be interpretable in ST is zero.
Introduction
The study of the relationship between ZF and PA models goes back to Ackermann's demonstration that PA and ZF f in (ZF without the infinity axiom) are mutually interpretable 1 [1] . The representation of numbers by ordinals goes back to the origins of set theory with Cantor. Conversely, the interpretation I A of membership as an arithmetic relation was proposed by Ackermann. Together, this two interpretations long supported the notion that ZF f in is the set theory equivalent of
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1 A interpretation of T 1 in T 2 is a mapping I of formulas of T 1 in T 2 such that: if α, β ∈ L T1 , then (a) (¬α) I = ¬α I , (b) (α ∨ β) I = α I ∨ β I ; if P (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is a predicate in T 1 , then (c) P I (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is a fixed formula of T 2 ; a formula U (z) in T 2 is such that (∀x(α)) I = ∀x(U (x) → α I ). Lastly, I is such that, for every theorem ϕ of T 1 , the formula ϕ I is a theorem of T 2 [8] . Two theories T 1 and T 2 are mutually interpretable if there is a interpretation of T 1 in T 2 and a interpretation of T 2 in T 1 .
arithmetic. However, Kaye and Wong in [9] have shown that Ackerman's interpretation is not "inversible". When we apply I A and then the ordinal interpretation to ZF f in we get a proper extension of the theory. The composed interpretation, therefore, loses information. On the other hand, Kaye and Wong proved that if we add that 'all sets are hereditary finite', then the new set theory ZF Hf in is bi-interpretable 2 with PA.
We note, however, that ZF Hf in is incompatible with the original ZF system, i.e. we would no longer be talking about a ZF subtheory. I will briefly advocate that the theory ZF Hf in should not count as a weaker version of ZF. Thus, in order to find a weaker version of ZF, we should restrict ourselves to subtheories of ZF. Nonetheless, I will prove that there is no such theory corresponding to PA. Contrarily to the common intuition, it means that there are fundamental differences between set theories and arithmetic. We continue our investigation by studying the capability of models to provide foundations. But we also want to keep explicit the fact that our views over models of set theory. Even though our conceptualization of models are such that each formula is either satisfied or not by a given model, our ability to determine which option is the case is limited. The reason is that if the only thing we know about V is that it satisfies ZF, then we can determine that V ⊧ ϕ if, and only if, ZF ⊢ ϕ.
This is the reason why we may consider models as their syntactical representation via interpretations. Each model definable in a given base model V ⊧ ZF can be said be to the result of bounding the elements of V to a given interpretation I. By doing so, we can keep in mind our limited knowledge of the models. Since, if M is definable in V (i.e M = I V ) and we do not know any other information about V other than it satisfies ZF, then (1) We know M ⊧ ϕ if, and only if, ZF ⊢ ϕ I Further, we investigate the foundational relation represented by interpreting PA in ZF. Notably, the standard interpretation expands 2 Theories T 1 and T 2 are bi-interpretable when (i) there is a interpretation I of T 1 in T 2 and a interpretation J of T 2 in T 1 and (ii) applying I followed by J (or J followed by I) in a arbitrary formula α results in a equivalent formula in T 2 (or T 1 in the second case).
3 Each theorem presented in the introduction will be proved in the further sections of the paper. 4 This theorem is related to techniques to be further developed in Biinterpretation as condition for isomorphism in set theories (in preparation in joint work with Hamkins) [6] . Important developments with respect to arithmetic and set theory can be found in Enayat's [3] and Friedman's & Visser's [5] .
what may be considered true for arithmetic -i.e. many independent formulas in PA become theorems as we see them in ZF through the interpretation. We show that this expansion occurs for any well-founded interpretation between PA and ZF.
Theorem 2. Every well founded interpretation I of a recursive extension A of PA in an extension S of ZF is such that there is an undecidable formula ϕ in A that is interpreted as theorem in S under the interpretation.
But, even though we expect that interpretations of PA in ZF expand arithmetical truth, an extension of ZF does not completely decide on arithmetical formulas: Theorem 3. For any recursive extension S of ZF and any interpretation I (for instance, the standard interpretation) there is a arithmetical formula that S does not decide under the interpretation.
At any stage in the development of ZF, the concept of arithmetical truth will still be open. It is due to this phenomena that we consider what I call the coordination problem: consider that there are two groups of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms. The first will decide over axioms for arithmetic and the second for set theory. How should we consider the relation between the two groups? Note that if we consider that the arithmetic group should conform to any development provided by the set theory group, it becomes hard to see in what sense the interpretation of arithmetic into set theory have any foundational role. Eventually, this framework is indistinguishable from simply considering that arithmetic lives inside set theory.
Therefore, it is important to consider the possibility of the coordination between the two theories to break. Is it possible that an extension of arithmetic not to be interpretable in any extension of a given extension of set theory? We show this is the case with the result: Theorem 4. For any recursive extension A of PA and given that S is an extension of ZF, there is a extension A + of A that is not interpretable in S.
It is indeed possible to generate the extension A + for any given S. But, how likely is it to be the case? If we consider that any consistent extension of arithmetic is equally likely at any stage in the development of the arithmetical group, then the probability that the ultimate stage of the development of arithmetic is interpretable in a given extension of ZF is zero. This is established by the last theorem presented in this paper:
Theorem 5. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the probability that a random consistent extension of a S-standard version of PA is interpretable in S is zero.
What do we mean by set theoretic version of PA?
We mentioned in the previous section that the interpretation between ZF f in and PA blurred subtle differences between systems. Indeed, while we do not add the hereditary finite axiom to ZF f in , the theory is not able to define an isomorphism with its own copy in PA. This result is widely referred to by the mathematical community as the discovery of the set theory equivalent of PA. Therefore, refuting the axiom of infinity is essential. We do not subscribe to this position and understand it as excessively arbitrary. If we speak of "set equivalent" in the sense that it makes use of the language of membership, in fact, ZF Hf in is a set equivalent of PA. However, if we want to imply more than this linguistic feature, I believe they are wrong.
Set is a concept axiomatized incompletely by ZF, by ZF without foundation, or even by rather weak theories like Z or Kripke-Platek. Working with theories such as ZF + CH and ZF + ¬ CH, we deal with the conflict between two possible notions of set. This would not necessarily happen if we denied the axiom of union or extensionality. Many would say we are no longer talking about sets in case we negate these axioms. I understand that the infinity axiom is part of the fundamental axioms of set theory 5 . After all, the very birth of modern set theory is directly related to the understanding of infinite quantities. This does not mean that we need to state the existence of infinity quantities -we are still talking about sets when we study ZF without the infinity axiom. Therefore, if we speak of a theory that partially axiomatizes sets (as any theory would necessarily be), it must be at least compatible with the statement of infinity. So if we are looking for a set equivalent for PA, we should formulate axiomatizations of set theory that are still compatible with the set theory axioms (eg, ZF). However, we prove the following:
Lemma 1. No model of Z is bi-interpretable with any model of PA.
Proof. Let M ⊧ Z be bi-interpretable with A ⊧ P A. Then there is a definable copy M of M in A and a M-definable isomorphism i from M to M. From this, we prove that ∈ M is well founded in A.
Let D be such that DǫN (and, thus, AǫM) and
We then obtain the class
Let < be the natural order in A. Since A see's ∈ M as well founded, it follows that one of the classes ⟨A, <⟩ and the ordinals of M is an initial segment of the other.
(1) Suppose that the ordinals of M are a proper initial segment of A : Let h be the embbeding of On M in ⟨A, <⟩ and take ω M = i(ω). It follows that h −1 (ω M ) = a for some a in A. It is easy to see that a is not zero in A, thus there must be an element
(2) Suppose that A is a initial segment of the ordinals in M.
We know that (ω+1) M ǫ A and that the class ⟨(ω+1) M , ∈ M ⟩ is a well ordered in A. If this is not a proper class, we would obtain the absurd as in (1) .
Note that ω M is in the domain of the class. Then we take a = h(ω M ) and obtain the absurd as in (1) . Therefore, it is not possible that the models M and A are bi-interpretable.
From this, we obtain the theorem: Theorem 1. No subtheory 6 of any extension of Z is bi-interpretable with any extension of PA.
Proof. Let S be a subtheory of an extension of ZF and A an extension of PA. If these theories are bi-interpretable, each model of one is biinterpretable with a model of the other. Consider a model M ⊧ ZF , then M is also model of S. Moreover, every model of A is a model of PA. Therefore, from the lemma, M is not bi-interpretable with any model of PA.
We note that "weakening ZF" by taking ever weaker sub-theories will never lead us to a bi-interpretable theory with PA. We therefore suggest that there is no set theoretic equivalent for PA.
2.1.
Another foundational characterization of PA in ZF. Lets consider N to be the standard interpretation of PA in ZF. So, when we take the theory A = {ϕ ZF ⊢ ϕ N } we expect to obtain a proper extension of PA. Indeed some undecidable formulas of PA are 'true'
6 Definition: T is subtheory of T ′ if, and only if, for every formula
in the standard model. This is the case for the Gödel formula, Goodstein's theorem and many others. We will thus consider the question of expansion of arithmetic truth from interpretations in set theories.
Theorem 2. Let A be a consistent recursive extension of PA and S a consistent extension of ZF. Lets further assume that there is a well founded interpretation I of A in S. Then there is a formula ϕ which is undecidable in A such that S ⊢ ϕ I . In other words, arithmetical truth is expanded under the interpretation I of A in S.
Proof. Since P A is bi-interpretable with ZF f in , there is a recursive extension S ′ of ZF f in bi-interpretable by B with A. Lets suppose S is conservative for A under the interpretation I:
and only if, A ⊢ ϕ
Then we can obtain an interpretation J of S ′ in S such that
Since the bi-interpretation B is well founded and I is well founded, J is also well founded. Thus, by Mostowski collapse, we have J is isomorphic with the interpretation ⟨M, ∈⟩ with M a transitive class. We note that M ⊆ V ω in S, for otherwise we would have an infinite member a. In turn, this implies in S ′ the contradiction ⋃{rank(x) x ∈ a} is inductive. Notably, as S ′ is consistent, V ω satisfies the predicate Con(S ′ ). It follows that S ⊢ Con Vω (S ′ ). But this is absurd, for it would imply the contradiction S ′ ⊢ Con(S ′ ). Therefore, the statement (2) is false. As A ⊢ ϕ implies S ⊢ ϕ I by the interpretation, there is a formula γ such that S ⊢ γ I and γ is undecidable in A.
Another form to consider the problem is to guarantee that the system S realizes whether it is or not an expansion of A under the interpretation. Proposition 1. Let A be a consistent recursive extension of PA and S a consistent extension of ZF. Lets further assume that there is a recursive process δ definable in S that enumerates formulas that satisfies S ⊢ ϕ I implies A ⊢ ϕ. Then there is a formula ϕ which is undecidable in A such that S ⊢ ϕ I .
Proof. Take ϕ such that P A ⊬ ¬ϕ, then P A ∪ {ϕ} is consistent from completeness theorem in S. Thus, for S ⊢ Con(P A), any finite extension P A + ϕ is such that S ⊢ Con(P A + ϕ). Further, for A is a recursive extension of PA, we have that any finite subset ∆ of A is such that S ⊢ Con(∆). So S ⊢ Con(A) from compactness theorem.
Lets suppose I is an interpretation of A in S and further that (4) S ⊢ ϕ I if, and only if, A ⊢ ϕ.
Thus, from the enumeration δ, we may internalize the argument in (4) as S ⊢ ⌜(4)⌝ -since the enumeration of the converse is given by the interpretation. We note that (4) implies Con(A) ↔ Con(S). So, by also internalizing this argument in S, we obtain
From Gödel's incompleteness theorem, we have that S ⊬ Con(S). Therefore
And this is a contradiction. Thus the equation 4 is false. However, we know that A ⊢ ϕ implies S ⊢ ϕ I from the interpretation. We conclude that there is a formula undecidable ϕ in A such that S ⊢ ϕ I .
A general answer to the problem is still open. Is it possible to build an interpretation of recursive and consistent extensions S and A such that there is an interpretation of A in S preserving A's truth? We believe not. And the results presented indicate that this may not be possible.
The coordination problem
We have seen that interpretations of arithmetic in set theories generally expand what may be taken to be arithmetical truth. Yet this expansion is not necessarily complete. A confusion in this regard is due to the idea that model constructions in set theories offer venues for defining truth for interpreted theories. Each interpretation I represents the appropriate model construction such that the grounding set theory can provide the notion of satisfaction I ⊧ ϕ for any formula. Eventually, we would have that for any formula γ, either I ⊧ γ or I ⊧ ¬γ. However, a more syntactical approach make it clear that this is simply the expression of the excluded middle. Indeed, "either I ⊧ γ or I ⊧ ¬γ" should be syntactically represented by the trivial theorem
Instead, what is really wanted is a notion like
As we suppose a base model V for ZF, we are at hand with a interpretation for ZF itself. In this case, the notion of truth in a model is represented by "either I V ⊧ γ or I V ⊧ ¬γ". However, if our supposition of a model V is not informed by any specific information other than V ⊧ ZF , the interpretation works simply as the identity. Therefore, we return to the problem of establishing a notion as in (8) .
Nonetheless, the notion in (8) is not achievable for any recursive extension of ZF: Theorem 3. There are formulas α ∈ L P A that are undecidable under any given interpretation I for any given recursive extension S of ZF.
Proof. To prove this result we should reinternalize the provability predicate under the interpretation. Indeed, if we consider the theory A = {ϕ S ⊢ ϕ I }, the statement "x is an axiom" becomes a semi-recursive predication. Thus it seems that we would not be able to internalize a truth predicate for this new theory.
The point is that we should not internalize the predicate directly for the theory A. Instead, we note that (1) "x is a proof in S" is recursive.
(2) "x is I of a formula in A" is recursive. Thus (3) "x is a proof in S that ends with I of the y in A" is recursive. We call P r(x, y) the representation of the last statement in A. Moreover, this statement is the desired provability predicate used in Gödel's incompletness theorem. Thus, by applying Rosser's trick and the diagonal lemma, we obtain a formula G that is undecidable in A. Therefore G is undecidable under the interpretation I in the ZF extension S.
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This theorem can be understood as a small extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem as we consider decidability under relations between theories. Moreover, it relates to results available in Satisfaction is not absolute [7] . In this article, Hamkins and Yang considered the idea that there may be arithmetical formulas ρ that two models of ZF disagree -even as these same models agree on what is the standard model for arithmetic. Although very insightful on interesting model constructions, it lacks a construction for the ρ formula. This formulas is obtained as the existential for a number representing a formula. In fact, exhibiting ρ is not possible, for it would imply the inconsistency of ZF.
Differently, we have shown a similar phenomena where the disagreement can be exhibited. To make it possible we considered a foundational view that accommodate our incomplete understanding of set theory and arithmetic. Thus, agreement about arithmetic is to be understood as having similar sets of arithmetical truths {ϕ S ⊢ ϕ N }, being S some stage (or alternative stage) in the development of ZF. In this sense, there is a formula ρ that would be true in some possible development of S and false in some other possible development of S.
3.1. The experiment of two mathematical communities. Lets consider the following fictional scenario for the development of set theory and arithmetic. There are two group of mathematicians that would decide about new axioms for set theory and arithmetic. The first one G s is responsible for set theory and the second G a for arithmetic. Lets further assume that G a agrees with the standard expansion of arithmetic in ZF (T h ZF (P A) is considered valid for G a ). How should we frame the relation between the two groups?
Consider that G s have decided in favor of new axiom A to set theory ZF. Notably, this would expand the set of arithmetic truth in T h ZF +A (P A). Should G a consider this new set to be true? This being the general attitude towards arithmetic means that the standard reduction determine new truths for arithmetic. In what sense, thus, the standard interpretation provides grounds for the new arithmetical truths? It seems like we have simply assumed that arithmetic lives in set theory from the beginning, without any further considerations. Therefore, G a would have no authority over new arithmetic axioms after all.
We may now consider that the standard interpretation is a good yet revisable set theoretic inspection over arithmetic. And it is because we assume the interpretation to be revisable that a foundational relation can be argued. As truth expands in both theories we evaluate conflicts and revise, if necessary, the interpretation to accommodate changes. A summary of the steps in this coordination can be:
(1) Every addition of axioms to one theory should provoke an inspection over the adequacy of the current interpretation of arithmetic in set theory. (2) If a conflict emerges in the development of the theories, the two groups should meet to adjust the interpretation to prevent the conflict. (3) The adequacy of an interpretation should have reasons for itself apart from accommodating the interpretation.
We have added some life to the grounding relation by allowing it to fail. Nevertheless, there is still a deeper problem. From the assumption that there is a ultimate arithmetic theory, the following scenario is still possible:
(1) Each instance of the development allows one to fix the interpretation between the theories. (2) The ultimate arithmetic theory is not possibly interpreted in set theory.
Allowing this be possible crumbles the edifice of the grounding relation. Each state of the development of the theories is an incomplete stage in which we cannot necessarily anticipate the impossibility of reductions occurring further in the development of the theories. This scenario is possible, as we see in the next theorem. Theorem 4. Let S be a consistent extension of ZF and A an recursive extension of PA, then there is an extension of A * that is not interpretable in S.
Proof. We extend the theory A by generating a sequence of theories that are not interpretable in S by a particular interpretation I. Being these theories compatible with each other, the union of them will not be interpretable in S.
Let A 0 = A and {I 1 , I 2 , . . .} an enumeration of all interpretations from the language of PA in the language of ZF. (abbreviation:
We note that A * is a consistent extension of A. We prove that this theory is not interpretable in S.
Suppose A * is interpretable by I in S, then I = I k for some natural number k. Notably, if a theory T is interpreted in a theory T ′ , then any subtheory of T is interpreted in T ′ by the same interpretation. We proved that it is possible for the theories ZF and PA to discord after some development. Although disturbing, this may simply account for the meaningfulness of the question about the reduction between the two theories. We have considered that we should conceive it to fail (even fatally, as in this case) in order to not take for granted that the reduction works. This pays tribute to the idea that by interpreting arithmetic in set theory we should inform something that was not simply given, i.e., that arithmetic lives in the realm of set theory. Nonetheless, the following result should dissuade those who are still hopeful that the theories can possibly have a strong grounding relation:
Theorem 5. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the probability that a random consistent extension of PA is interpretable in S is zero.
Proof. Lets consider the set Σ of consistent extensions of PA.
From the incompletness theorem, there is a formula G that is undecidable in PA. Thus both P A + G and P A + ¬G are consistent.
Notably, this is still true for the addition of any finite number of new axioms α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n . There is a formula G that is undecidable in P A+ {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n }. The process of adding axioms continues indefinitely.
Lets then index extensions with binary numbers in the following way:
(1) A 0 = P A.
(2) If G is the Gödel sentence in A i , then A i1 is A i + G and A i0 is A i + ¬G. (i1 and i0 are the binary extension of the number i with the digits 1 and 0) (3) Σ = {A n n ∈ ω} is the set of finite extensions of PA.
Note that each member of Σ is a finite extension of PA. Now we include infinite extensions of PA in Σ. Let Π be a set of ⋃ C, for each C a subset-chain in Σ. The index for the members of (Π ∖ Σ) can be describe by functions ω → {1, 0}. Thus, as a simple consequence, the set of indexes of the extensions is in bijection with P (ω).
Each theory with infinite sequences as indexes is indeed a different theory, for any difference in the sequence means that one theory has a a formula like G and the other a formula ¬G.
Nonetheless, the number of interpretations is trivially countable. Also, since the same interpretation cannot accommodate incompatible theories, there must be a extension of PA that is not interpretable in the extension S. Moreover, as we are comparing countable possible interpretable extensions with uncountable non-interpretable extensions, the probability of picking a interpretable extension is zero.
We note that same can be obtained, even if the starting point includes all theorems of the set theory S under the interpretation. Indeed, we can include the theorems under a given interpretation at any point without interfering in the result. Corollary 1. For every consistent extension S of ZF, the probability that a random consistent extension of a S-standard version of PA ({φ S ⊢ φ I }, being I the current standard interpretation) is interpretable in S is zero.
To prove this corollary, we need only to include the result in the theorem 3 in the strategy of the last theorem.
Although extensions like A + are in general not interpretable in S, the process of generating these theories is internalizable in S. Therefore, we may say that S proves the consistency predicate for all these extensions. This is not enough to claim a proper foundational relation. The model construction emerging from this type of consistency proof is simply given by the existence of a model as in the Henkin canonical construction. Thus the foundational model one can generate provide little more information than saying that the theory is consistent 8 . Therefore, we should not consider those cases as a path to avoid the problem discussed in this section.
Final remarks
We started this article by criticizing the understanding that finite set theory (ZF Hf in ) is the set theoretic equivalent of arithmetic (PA). It is not enough for the equivalence that the theories ZF Hf in and PA are bi-interpretable. One should also give reason for ZF Hf in to be considered 'a version of set theory'. We argued it should not. Instead, a theory T should be considered a version of set theory only if T is a sub-theory of our basic axiomatization of sets. However, we proved that no sub-theory of any extension of Zermelo set theory is bi-interpretable with any extension of PA. As discussed, this suggests a fundamental difference between arithmetic and set theory -the two theories are in different paths in the expressive roads.
Further, rather than manipulating models of PA, we considered interpretations of PA in ZF. Our goal was to accommodate the incomplete picture of the set theoretical metatheory to our analysis of the foundations of arithmetic. The ordinal interpretation expands what we may consider true in arithmetic: many undecidable formulas in PA become theorems when examined under the interpretation in ZF. This is a general phenomenon. For every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original.
We continue by defining the coordination problem. We considered two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms of ZF and PA. Using this setting, we studied the possibility of coordinating PA with PA's interpretation in ZF. Nonetheless, we proved that it is possible to have extensions of PA not interpretable in a given set theory ST. Moreover, we considered a given recursive extension A of PA and suppose any extension of this theory to be equally likely. Here, we prove that the probability for an extension A be interpretable in ST is zero.
We have, therefore, set a framework to criticize the notion of grounding between theories such as arithmetic and set theory. However, this is not to be understood as a general criticism on the idea of using set theory to investigate foundational matters regarding arithmetic. Instead, we have sole shown how assuming that set theory really provide grounds for arithmetic truth or a definitive description of the universe of numbers may be flawed. Our suggestion is therefore to consider a foundational relation that aims primarily at conceptional clarification of the concepts involved in the 'grounded' theory. An expressively rich environment such as set theory is armed with tools to study arithmetical relations in wider settings than it would be possible without leaving its deductive apparatus.
